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RU 486 EXAMINED: IMPACT OF A NEW
TECHNOLOGY ON AN OLD CONTROVERSY
Gwendolyn Prothro*
Abortion is an extremely divisive issue in American politics
and culture. Prothro begins this Article by analyzing the
current legal standards governing reproduction, which draw
a sharp distinction between abortion and contraception.
Prothro then examines the function of RU 486, demonstrat-
ing that it acts both as a contraceptive and as an abortifa-
cient. Because of this dual capacity, RU 486 does not fit
neatly into the current legal framework. Prothro concludes
this Article by arguing that RU 486 should force the Su-
preme Court to create a new framework for the "procreative
right." Prothro argues that this new framework should treat
the procreative right as a continuum, basing legal
protections on a close analysis of the rights at stake, rather
than on artificial distinctions that do not accurately mirror
the physiological process of pregnancy. This new continuum
analysis, Prothro contends, will expand and deepen the
abortion debate by focusing it on the broader issues underly-
ing the current debate.
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, . . . it
was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we
had everything before us ..
INTRODUCTION
Debating, lobbying, picketing, marching, harassing,
shooting-such has been the abortion controversy in America.
After decades of debate we have reached an impasse. The
arguments have been articulated fully; the sentiments have
* A.B., 1993, Princeton University; J.D., 1996, Harvard Law School; law clerk
to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas,
1996-97. Thanks to Professor Elizabeth Bartholet of Harvard Law School, who
supervised the writing of a paper, extracts of which make up this Article. Thanks'
also to Virginia Wise, lecturer on law for legal research at Harvard Law School; this
Article began in her legal research class in the Spring of 1995.
1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 1 (Dodd, Mead and Co. 1925)
(1859).
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been expressed. Yet, there is no resolution in sight. We have
debated ourselves into polarized, extreme positions.2 Many of
us, weary of the shouting and shooting, are eager to find
something new to move us past the impasse.3
RU 486, a new contragestive technology, may break the
abortion controversy deadlock.4 RU 486, or mifepristone, is a
drug that blocks the activity of the hormone progesterone in
the body. RU 486 has become a focus of political debate about
abortion because its progesterone-blocking properties allow it
to act as both an abortifacient and a contraceptive. Depend-
ing on the circumstances, RU 486 can stop ovulation, prevent
implantation or terminate pregnancy after implantation.
This Article explores the legal impact of RU 486 on the
abortion controversy in America. Part I defines the concepts
discussed in this Article as well as the legal standards sur-
rounding them. Part II introduces RU 486, its medical proper-
ties and potential uses. Part III discusses RU 486's potential
legal impact on the abortion controversy. This Article argues
that the existence of RU 486 further blurs the physiological
and legal lines between contraception and abortion, forcing us
to rethink the definitions and legal standards associated with
each. Perhaps this re-examination can push us past the im-
passe by expanding and deepening the abortion debate, allow-
ing us to discuss the broader issues it raises, such as sexual
morality, family planning and gender roles.
2. See James Davison Hunter, Our Bodies Politic: Abortion, Condoms, Porn,
AIDS: In Our Physical Selves, a Struggle for Civilization, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1994,
at C1 ("Debate ... presupposes that people are talking to each other. A more apt
description of the present situation is that Americans engaged in the contemporary
culture war only talk past each other."); see also ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREE-
MAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS ABORTION DEBATABLE? 129 (1993) (noting "the
strife occasioned by this singularly divisive issue over the past twenty years");
HYMAN RODMAN, THE ABORTION QUESTION 160 (1987) (claiming that "the moral
debate [over abortion] is irresolvable"); cf THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMER-
ICAN SYSTEM 5 (Gilbert Y. Steiner ed., 1983) (discussing proposed "rules" to facili-
tate a higher quality of debate over the issue of abortion).
3. See Ellen Goodman, A Place for the Abortion Pill in America, WASH. POST,
May 14, 1991, at A19 ("Americans overwhelmingly want to end the prolonged and
nasty war over abortion."); cf Clyde Wilcox, The Sources and Consequences of Public
Attitudes Toward Abortion, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 55, 61
(Ted G. Jelen ed., 1995) ("Although activists on the abortion issue take uncompro-
mising positions and have world views that differ radically, the public is more
ambivalent on abortion.") (citation omitted).
4. Cf LAWRENCE LADER, RU 486: THE PILL THAT COULD END THE ABORTION
WARS AND WHY AMERICAN WOMEN DON'T HAVE IT 19 (1991) (stating that RU 486






One word, abortion, can ignite passionate debate and even
incite violence.5 The term, however, is not self-explanatory.
Etymologically, the word "abort" finds its origin in the Latin
aboriri, to miscarry.6 Today, the term abortion refers to an
induced abortion, or the deliberate termination of a pregnancy
(as distinguished from the prevention of pregnancy, which is
called contraception).' The definition of abortion depends on
the definition of pregnancy, which is itself the subject of
debate.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
defines pregnancy as beginning with the completed implanta-
tion of the fertilized egg in the womb,8 and describes the
development of human life along a continuum. This develop-
ment begins with the fertilization of the ovum by the sperm.9
Fertilization involves multiple steps, lasting twelve to twenty-
four hours, after which the fertilized egg (called the zygote)
moves to the uterus.' ° Five to six days after fertilization, the
5. See Abortion Debate Scrapbook, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1989, at 50 (stating that
between 1977 and 1987, 607 abortion clinics were picketed, 134 received harassing
mail or telephone calls, 208 received bomb threats, 32 were bombed and 38 were set
on fire); see also Curtis Boyd, The Morality of Abortion: The Making of a Feminist
Physician, 13 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 303, 307 (1993); Alan Sverdlik, Blasts Rock
Atlanta Abortion Clinic, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1997, at A3; Linda Wheeler, Police,
Volunteers Prepare to Protect Clinics, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1995, at A12.
6. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 45 (9th ed. 1987).
7. See COMMITTEE ON TERMINOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRI-
CIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC TERMINOLOGY 414 (1972)
[hereinafter COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS]. This definition excludes naturally occur-
ring spontaneous miscarriages. See id.
8. See id. at 299, 327; see also Rebecca Cook, Antiprogestin Drugs: Medical and
Legal Issues, 42 MERCER L. REV. 971, 972 (1991). Scientists did. not have a basic
understanding of pregnancy until 1827, when they discovered the egg. Before then,
scientists had assumed that within each woman existed a homunculus, or "little
man," who was fully formed but who lay dormant until "quickening." See BARBARA
MILBAUER, THE LAW GIVETH: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 111
(1983).
9. See COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS, supra note 7, at 299, 327.
10. See BriefAmici Curiae of the Alan Guttmacher Institute et al., in Support
of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al., at 29-30 n.22, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902) (describing the
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fertilized egg (now called the blastocyst) implants itself in the
lining of the uterus." Implantation also involves multiple
steps, occurring over six to seven days.'2 Only at the comple-
tion of implantation does pregnancy begin.' 3 According to this
medical definition of pregnancy, abortion is any procedure
that terminates the development of a fertilized egg following
implantation. A procedure that terminates the development of
a fertilized egg prior to completed implantation is contra-
ception.
Abortion opponents define pregnancy differently. They
believe that pregnancy and life begin with "the union of the
sperm and the ovum."' 4 Under this definition, abortion is any
procedure that terminates the development of the fertilized
egg at any point following the initial fertilization of the egg by
the sperm. Contraception, then, is limited to procedures used
prior to fertilization. 5
Until now, the difference between abortion and contracep-
tion was clearly distinguished in definition and practice;
technology kept the "grey" period between fertilization and
implantation outside the scope of discussion. Common
"barrier-method" contraceptives, such as the condom and the
diaphragm, prevent the sperm from reaching the egg,' 6 and
thus act prior to the occurrence of pregnancy under both
definitions. The traditional birth control pill also acts prior to
pregnancy by suppressing ovulation.' 7 In contrast, a tradi-
details of fertilization) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae of the Alan Guttmacher
Institute].
11. See id. at 30-31.
12. See id.
13. See David A. Grimes & Rebecca J. Cook, Mifepristone (RU 486)-An Aborti-
facient to Prevent Abortion?, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1088, 1089 (1992).
14. Richard Glasow, Education Director of the National Right to Life Committee,
quoted in Don Colburn, A Morning-After Pill: New Study Says RU-486 Works Better
than Current Methods, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1992, (Health) at 7; see also GERMAIN
GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS 13-14 (1970)
(claiming that the "certain moment when the new individual begins" occurs when the
sperm and ovum unite).
15. To say that abortion opponents distinguish between contraception and
abortion is not to suggest that they condone contraception while condemning
abortion. Many condemn both with equal fervor. See Abortion Debate Scrapbook,
supra note 5, at 51 (statement of Judie Brown, American Life Lobby) ("We are totally
opposed to abortion under any circumstances. We are also opposed to abortifacient
drugs and chemicals like the pill and the I.U.D., and we are also opposed to all forms
of birth control, with the exception of [the rhythm method].").
16. See ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 159-60,
196-98 (15th rev. ed. 1990).
17. See id. at 228.
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tional abortion is a surgical procedure performed after the
sixth week of pregnancy. The earliest surgical abortions
remove the embryo from the lining of the uterus by vacuum
aspiration 8 or dilation and curettage, 19 clearly terminating
pregnancy under both definitions. RU 486 cuts across both
definitions and forces examination of the "grey" period.
B. Legal Standards
Constitutional jurisprudence and legislative enactments
apply different standards to women's rights to contraception
and abortion, and do not specifically address the "grey" period
between fertilization and implantation. ° Under current legal
standards, a person has a constitutional right to use contra-
ception, and a state cannot abridge that right without a com-
pelling interest. Griswold v. Connecticut21 and its progeny
22
established the fundamental right to use contraception, and
this right "remains relatively uncontroversial and unchallenged."23
18. See MILBAUER, supra note 8, at 75. Vacuum aspiration "calls for a small tube
to be inserted into the uterus. The tube acts as a tiny vacuum and draws out any
material, including the embryo, that is in the uterus." Id.
19. See id. When abortion is performed by dilation and curettage, "[tihe cervix
is dilated and an instrument called a curette is used to scrape the lining of the
uterus." Id.
20. Methods such as the intra-uterine device ("IUD"), Norplant, and the low-
dose birth control pill operate both before and after fertilization, before and during
the grey period. See HATCHER, supra note 16, at 355-57 (discussing IUD function
and effectiveness); see also Donna Shoupe & Daniel R. Mishell, Norplant: Subdermal
Implant System for Long-Term Contraception, 160 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
1286, 1287-88 (1989); HATCHER, supra note 16, at 228. Thus far, the law has treated
these technologies as contraceptives. For example, the Pennsylvania legislature
excluded oral contraceptives and the IUD from its definition of abortion, even though
it defined life as beginning with fertilization. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Alan
Guttmacher Institute, supra note 10, at 33-34; see also Margaret S. v. Edwin
Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 191 (E.D. La. 1980) ("Abortion, as it is commonly
understood, does not include the IUD ... or ... birth control pills.").
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right of marital privacy, including the
use of contraception).
22. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding unconstitu-
tional a New York law restricting the sale and distribution of nonprescription
contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right of
privacy to include the right of unmarried people to use contraception).
23. Kari Hanson, Approval of RU-486 as a Postcoital Contraceptive, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 163, 178 (1993); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
852 (1992) ("[In some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same character
as the decision to use contraception, to which Griswold. . .Eisenstadt ... and Carey
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In Griswold the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut
statute prohibiting the use of "any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception."24 The
Court held that the law unconstitutionally violated a married
couple's right to privacy and sought "to achieve its goals by
means having a maximum destructive impact upon" a pro-
tected relationship.25 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas
looked beyond the text of the Constitution to identify values
the "existence [of which] is necessary in making the express
guarantees fully meaningful."" Justice Douglas found privacy
to be a "unifying theme" among these Constitutional values
and crystallized them into "zone[s] of privacy."27 Finally,
Justice Douglas wrote that the marriage relationship fits
within the zone of privacy, and that the Connecticut law
banning the use of contraception by a married couple uncon-
stitutionally encroached upon this protected zone.28
Seven years later, the Court, relying on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, extended the right
of contraception to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.29 Justice Brennan broadly stated that "[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."3 ° In Carey v.
Population Services International,31 again writing for the
.. afford constitutional protection. We have no doubt as to the correctness of those
decisions."); Brief of Amici Curiae 274 Organizations in Support of Roe v. Wade on
Behalf of Appellees, at 8 n. 12, Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron II), 497
U.S. 502 (1990) and Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, appeal dismissed, 503 U.S.
916 (1992) (Nos. 88-790 and 88-805) ("The United States has conceded the correct-
ness of the Griswold line of cases before this Court.") [hereinafter Brief of Amici
Curiae 274 Organizations].
24. 381 U.S. at 480.
25. Id. at 485.
26. Id. at 483.
27. Id. at 485; see also L. Kent Sezer, The Constitutional Underpinnings of the
Abortion Debate, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF ABORTION, supra note 3, at
131, 150 (analyzing the Griswold Court's movement from general privacy rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to a specific privacy right).
28. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
29. 405 US. 438, 443 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute
banning the distribution of contraceptives, for the purpose of preventing conception,
to unmarried persons but allowing their distribution to married persons with a
prescription).
30. Id. at 453.
31. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
720
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majority, Justice Brennan recognized the right to contracep-
tion as fundamental and deserving of protection under the
Court's strict scrutiny test.3 2 The Court held that a state's
regulation of contraception "may be justified only by a 'com-
pelling state interest' . . . and ... must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake."3
Under current legal standards, a woman has a constitution-
al right to abortion. The Court recognized this right in Roe v.
Wade,34 and reinterpreted the right in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. 5 Although the Court likened the abortion right to the
contraception right, the Court also distinguished the two
rights at length.36 Unlike the right to contraception, a wom-
an's right to abortion can be regulated, and is anything but
uncontroversial or unchallenged.37
In Casey, the Court's joint opinion began by focusing on
"liberty,"38 emphasizing its importance in terms reminiscent of
the Griswold Court's description of "privacy." Just as the
Court described "zones" of privacy in Griswold, the Court in
Casey found that liberty was not a "series of isolated points,"39
but a "realm," a broad value derived from the substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.4 ° Within this protected realm of personal liberty
existed procreative freedom, just as the marriage relationship
existed within the Griswold privacy zone.
The joint opinion made several statements supporting the
protection of procreative freedom from state interference, and
quoted Justice Brennan's statement in Eisenstadt supporting
an individual's right to make procreative decisions without
"unwarranted governmental intrusion."4 For example, the
32. See id. at 686-89.
33. Id. at 688 (omissions in original) (citations omitted).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. See Casey, 505 US. at 849-53.
37. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 23, at 182 ("Grounded in privacy, this funda-
mental right not to procreate remains relatively uncontroversial and unchallenged.
On the other hand, the right to choose abortion has become increasingly controver-
sial . . . since . . . Roe . . . ."); Sylvia Law, Abortion Compromise-Inevitable and
Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 923-32 (stating that Roe has been "effectively
overruled" since 1989).
38. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("The controlling word in the casel before us is
'liberty.' ").
39. Id. at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
40. See id. at 847-48.
41. Id. at 851 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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Court asserted that "[iut is settled now ... that the Consti-
tution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood."42
The Court then explained:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education .... Our
precedents "have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter." . . . These matters, involv-
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.43
The Casey Court reaffirmed the fundamental right to use
contraception and supported the cases that granted that right
strict scrutiny protection from state intrusion." The Court
analogized abortion to contraception, stating, "[it should be
recognized, moreover, that in some critical respects the abor-
tion decision is of the same character as the decision to use
contraception, to which Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, and Carey v. Population Services International afford
constitutional protection."45 Standing alone, this analogy
might lead to the assumption that the two rights should
receive the same level of constitutional protection. The Court,
however, went on to distinguish abortion from contraception,
elaborating on the critical respects in which they were differ-
ent and emphasizing the uniqueness of abortion.46 The Court
treated abortion differently from most liberty rights because
the Court viewed abortion as a unique and different right.
The abortion standard developed by the Court in Casey does
not protect post-viability abortion, which can be prohibited
42. Id. at 849 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 851 (citations omitted) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944)).
44. See id. at 852.
45. Id.
46. See id. ("These considerations begin our analysis of the woman's interest in
terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it .... Abortion is a unique act. It is an
act fraught with consequences for others . . ").
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except "'where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.' 4 7 Pre-viability abortions cannot be prohibited out-
right, but can be regulated as long as the regulations are
rationally related to the state's interests (either in maternal
health or in the potential life of the fetus) and not unduly
burdensome on the woman's right to abortion. 48 A state regu-
lation is unduly burdensome if it "has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus."49 A regulation is not invali-
dated simply because it has "the incidental effect of making it
more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion."5" The
Casey Court found parental notification provisions (with
judicial bypass clauses), waiting periods and state encourage-
ment to choose childbirth to be acceptable regulations of
abortion.5
Thus, the Court developed distinct standards for the rights
of contraception and abortion. Contraception is protected with
strict scrutiny, and states need compelling interests to regu-
late contraception. A woman is free to use birth-control pills,
IUDs or diaphragms without undue restriction or state in-
terference.52 A reviewing court will emphasize the woman's
rights and interests in using contraception, and will place a
great burden on any state attempting to infringe on those
rights through regulation.53
In contrast, a woman is not free to have an abortion unless
she complies with reasonable state regulations.54 If a woman
47. Id. at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973)).
48. See id. at 878-79.
49. Id. at 877.
50. Id. at 874.
51. See id. at 879-87.
52. See id. at 859. Traditional and post-coital contraceptives are protected by the
Griswold line of cases. See id. (stating that "Roe's scope is confined by the fact of its
concern with postconception potential life, a concern otherwise likely to be implicated
only by some forms of contraception, protected independently under Griswold and
later cases"); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 523
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (stating that "the use
of postfertilization contraceptive devices is constitutionally protected by Griswold
and its progeny"); ef Margaret S. v. Edwin Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 191 (E.D. La.
1980) (stating that "[albortion ... does not include the IUD . . . [or] birth control
pills").
53. See Carey v. Population Serva. Int'l, 431 U.S. 438, 687-91 (1977) (stating
that the Court views "maintaining medical standards" and "protecting potential life"
as compelling interests that justify regulating access to contraception).
54. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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does not abort before viability, she is assumed to have
"consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the
developing child."55 A reviewing court will emphasize the
state's "profound interest in potential life" and the state's
preference for childbirth.56 A court is unlikely to resolve
challenges to state abortion regulations as a matter of law.
Instead, it must ordinarily "conduct extensive factual trials to
assess the actual burdens of restrictive laws upon real
women."
57
The distinct legal standards developed by courts for con-
traception and abortion become problematic as new
contragestive technologies become available to women, as
contraception and abortion become less distinguishable in
practice, and as the difference in definitions becomes less
clear.
II. RU 486
This section explores the medical origin and uses of RU 486,
the new contragestive technology with the potential to make
the legal standards for contraception and abortion more
questionable and to blur the line further between contracep-
tion and abortion.
RU 486, or mifepristone, is a contragestive that acts as a
progesterone antagonist or anti-hormone. The molecular
structure of RU 486 resembles that of progesterone. RU 486
binds to the uterine progesterone receptors and inhibits pro-
gesterone activity in the uterus.58 Without progesterone, the
uterus cannot accept a fertilized egg for implantation or
retain an egg already implanted.59 The uterine lining breaks
down, bleeds and secretes prostaglandin, producing contrac-
tions and expelling the egg."'
55. Id. at 870.
56. Id. at 878.
57. Law, supra note 37, at 931.
58. See Louise Silvestre et al., Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy with
Mifepristone (RU 486) and a Prostaglandin Analogue: A Large-Scale French Experi-
ence, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 645, 645 (1990); LADER, RU 486, supra note 4, at 31-32.
59. See LADER, RU 486, supra note 4, at 31-32.
60. See Robin Herman, The Politics of the Abortion Pill, WASH. POST, Oct. 3,
1989, (Health) at 12; Andrd Ulmann et al., RU 486, Sci. AM., June 1990, at 42, 44.
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A. As an Abortifacient
Dr. Etienne-Emile Baulieu, a French scientist, first syn-
thesized RU 486 in 1980.61 In 1982, Dr. Walter Herman led
clinical tests of RU 486 in Switzerland.62 Within a few years,
Baulieu and his colleagues combined the administration of
RU 486 with a dose of prostaglandin, supplementing the
prostaglandin secreted by the uterus. This increased contrac-
tions and expelled the fertilized egg (or embryo) more
effectively. 3 Thus, Baulieu and his colleagues developed the
first non-surgical abortion alternative for women in the
modern world.
Baulieu and his colleagues developed a regimen under
which an aborting woman ingests a 600 milligram dose of
RU 486 within the first seven to nine weeks of her pregnan-
cy. 64 Thirty-six to forty-eight hours later, the woman returns
to her doctor to receive a dose of prostaglandin.65 Under the
original regimen, the prostaglandin was administered intra-
vaginally, or by injection at a fairly high dose. Since then,
scientists have shifted to oral administration and lowered the
dosage to reduce side effects.6 6 "In most cases the embryo and
all endometrial fragments [are] expelled within 24 hours after
the prostaglandin [is] administered." 7
Compared to surgical abortion, RU 486 is safe and ef-
fective. 68 Surgical abortion is over ninety-seven percent
effective. 69 Taken without the prostaglandin follow-up, RU 486
61. See Ulmann, supra note 60, at 45; Leonard A. Cole, The End of the Abortion
Debate, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 217 (1989).
62. See Megan Rosenfeld, Conception of a Controversy: the French Doctor and
His Pill to Prevent Pregnancy, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1986, at C1.
63. See Ulmann, supra note 60, at 47.
64. See id. at 47-48.
65. See id. at 47.
66. See Allan Rosenfield, Mifepristone (RU 486) in the United States: What Does
the Future Hold?, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1560 (1993). In part, the change from
injectable to oral prostaglandins occurred because of the death (the only death
reported thus far) of a thirty-one year-old, obese, heavy smoker in her thirteenth
pregnancy. The woman suffered a fatal heart attack after the injection of prostaglan-
din. See Amy D. Porter, International Reproductive Rights: The RU 486 Question, 18
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 179, 193 (1995).
67. Ulmann, supra note 60, at 47.
68. See id. at 47-48; see also Lauren Picker, Abortion to Go?, HARPER'S BAZAAR,
Oct. 1994, at 246, 268.
69. See Picker, supra note 68, at 268.
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is eighty percent effective in terminating pregnancies. 70 Taken
with the prostaglandin follow-up, RU 486 is ninety-six percent
effective, almost as effective as a surgical abortion. 71 An
RU 486 abortion does not involve many of the risks of
surgery, such as injuries to the cervix or uterus, infections or
complications from anesthesia. 72 An RU 486 abortion, howev-
er, is not less expensive than surgery, 73 and is also more time-
consuming than surgery, extending over a period of days as
opposed to a few hours, and requiring more recuperation
time.74
As with the administration of many drugs, an RU 486
abortion has side effects. The side effects are analogized to the
effects of menstrual periods or miscarriages; hence physician
supervision is an important part of the RU 486 abortion
protocol.71 Most of the side effects are caused by the prosta-
glandin follow-up rather than by RU 486 itself.76 With time,
the side effects may be minimized as scientists continue to
experiment with different prostaglandin analogues and doses.
Until then, however, an RU 486 abortion will cause discom-
fort. Many women aborting with RU 486 experience uterine
bleeding, lasting an average of nine days.77 Many women also
experience abdominal pain and cramping, 78 and others suffer
from nausea and fatigue. 79 Some women-those over the age
of thirty-five, heavy smokers and women suffering from asth-
ma, diabetes, hypertension or heart problems-are at risk of
70. See Ulmann, supra note 60, at 47.
71. See Silvestre, supra note 58, at 646.
72. See Cole, supra note 61, at 219; cf Emily MacFarquhar, The Case of the
Reluctant Drug Maker, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 23, 1989, at 54 (The World
Health Organization, "citing tests over the past seven years in more than 10,000
women, has confirmed that RU-486 is safe and efficacious.").
73. See Picker, supra note 68, at 247.
74. See Louise Levathes, Listening to RU 486, HEALTH, Jan./Feb. 1995, at 86.
75. See Picker, supra note 68, at 246. As of December 1992, only three women,
out of 100,000, suffered serious adverse side effects. Nevertheless, experience
illustrates the importance of medical monitoring of the RU 486 abortion process. See
Debora Fliegelman, Comment, The FDA and RU 486: Are Politics Compatible with
the FDA's Mandate of Protecting Public Health?, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 143, 146 (1993)
(discussing some of the adverse side effects experienced in clinical trials of RU 486).
76. See Michael Klitsch, Antiprogestins and the Abortion Controversy: A Progress
Report, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 275, 275 (1991).
77. See Silvestre, supra note 58, at 646; Ulmann, supra note 60, at 47-48. A few
women, however, may bleed so heavily as to require medical intervention. See
Klitsch, supra note 76, at 275-76.
78. See Klitsch, supra note 76, at 276.
79. See Porter, supra note 66, at 193.
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experiencing more serious side effects."0 For the women at
higher risk, an RU 486 abortion is not appropriate. 1
Some critics of RU 486 worry that the side effects extend
beyond those thus far identified,82 and that there may be
serious long-term health effects that remain undiscovered.
Scientists, however, point out that "[tihe drug metabolizes
quickly; three-quarters is dissipated within two days."83
RU 486 is unlikely to remain in the woman's system to cause
future problems.8 4 As of 1994, more than 150,000 European
women have used the drug "safely and effectively."" Women
have returned to normal menstrual cycles after aborting with
RU 486, and many have later given birth to "normal"
children.86
Surgical abortion is required in the four percent of cases in
which RU 486 does not induce abortion. Critics worry about
the few women who do not follow the RU 486 protocol and
take the RU 486 without returning for the prostaglandin, or
women who take both drugs but do not abort and do not
return for a surgical abortion.88 Initial results of RU 486
studies indicate that a child born despite an RU 486 admin-
istration does not suffer abnormalities.89 Incomplete abortions,
however, may lead to serious complications, and physician
supervision should be stressed.9
80. See Picker, supra note 68, at 247.
81. See Porter, supra note 66, at 193. The French Ministry of Health prohibits
women older than thirty-five, heavy smokers and women with a history of heart or
circulatory difficulties from using RU 486. See id.
82. See Gary Samuelson, DES, RU-486, and Deja Vu, 2 J. PHARMACY & L. 56,
65-70 (1993); see also Dorothy Wickenden, Drug of Choice: The Side Effects of RU
486, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1990, at 24, 26 (John Willke, president of the National
Right to Life Committee, stated that RU 486 is "[a] powerful, poisonous steroid [that]
kills unborn babies, will injure and kill women, and will cause an epidemic of fetal
deformity.").
83. Cole, supra note 61, at 219.
84. See Cole, supra note 61, at 219; see also David Van Biema, But Will It End
the Abortion Debate?, TIME, June 14, 1993, at 54 (stating that "informed advocates
argue that [fetal deformity] is chemically impossible").
85. See CBS This Morning (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 28, 1994) (interview
with Dr. David Grimes).
86. See Etienne-Emile Baulieu, RU 486 as an Antiprogesterone Steroid: From
Receptor to Contragestion and Beyond, 2626 JAMA 1808, 1812 (1989).
87. See Silvestre, supra note 58, at 646.
88. See Samuelson, supra note 82, at 66-68.
89. See Baulieu, supra note 86, at 1812 (recommending caution in administra-
tion despite these results).
90. See Samuelson, supra note 82, at 66-68.
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Though not a panacea, RU 486 offers a safe and effective
alternative to surgery for a woman seeking an abortion in the
first seven to nine weeks of pregnancy.9 '
B. As a Contraceptive
RU 486 has potential beyond its use as an abortifacient
because it can be used by a woman before she is pregnant.
RU 486, without a prostaglandin follow up, may be a safe and
effective postcoital contraceptive.92 A 1992 Scottish study of
800 women, published in the New England Journal of Medi-
cine, reported that RU 486, if taken within seventy-two hours
of unprotected intercourse, is more effective than the alterna-
tive postcoital contraceptive, which relies on high doses of
estrogen and progestogen.93 RU 486 also causes less nausea
and vomiting than the postcoital contraceptive alternative.94
91. Although this Article focuses on RU 486, the discussion also applies to other
forms of chemical abortion. For instance, scientists have also studied methotrexate
as an abortifacient. See Mitchell D. Creinin & Eric Vittinghoff, Methotrexate and
Misoprostol vs. Misoprostol Alone for Early Abortion: A Randomized Controlled Trial,
272 JAMA 1190, 1190-95 (1994) (finding that methotrexate induces abortion in the
first eight weeks of pregnancy, based on a small study sample). In August 1995, Dr.
Richard Hausknecht publicly confirmed methotrexate as an RU 486 alternative to
induce abortion in the first nine weeks of pregnancy. See Richard Hausknecht,
Methotrexate and Misoprostol to Terminate Early Pregnancy, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED.
537, 537-40 (1995); see also Sharon Begley, Abortion by Prescription, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 11, 1995, at 76. The methotrexate abortion protocol is similar to that of
RU 486. Cf Hausknecht, supra, at 537 & 540 (describing methotrexate as an
alternative to surgical abortion which gives women more privacy and control over
the abortion process).
92. See Anna Glasier et al., Mifepristone (RU 486) Compared with High-Dose
Estrogen and Progestogen for Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 327 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1041, 1041-44 (1992). Acting as a postcoital contraceptive, RU 486 prevents
implantation of the fertilized egg. See Grimes & Cook, supra note 13, at 1089.
RU 486 interrupts the egg's development after fertilization and thus fits into the
abortion opponents' definition of abortion, but not into the medical definition of
abortion. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
93. See Glasier supra note 92, at 1041-44. No woman in the RU 486 group
became pregnant, while four in the standard group did. See id. at 1042. The overall
failure rate was low for the standard regimen as well (1%), see id., but Glasier
predicted that a larger study would demonstrate how much more effective RU 486 is
than the alternative, see K.A. Fackelmann, New Use for the French "Abortion" Pill,
SCi. NEWS, Oct. 10, 1992, at 228.
94. See Glasier, supra note 92, at 1042-43. Forty percent of the women in the
RU 486 group experienced nausea, compared to sixty percent in the group that
received the standard post-coital contraceptive alternative; three percent of the
women in the RU 486 group experienced vomiting on the day of treatment, compared
to seventeen percent in the alternative group. See id. at 1043.
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RU 486 can be administered in one dose, instead of the multi-
ple doses of the alternative.95 The major drawback of RU 486
in the Scottish study was that the drug delayed the onset of a
woman's menstrual period, which could cause anxiety for
unwarned women.96
RU 486 may become an alternative to daily birth control
pills. Studies suggest that by blocking the progesterone secret-
ed during the early phase of a woman's cycle, RU 486 may
block the release of the egg (ovulation).9v Taken in the latter
part of the menstrual cycle RU 486 induces menstruation. 98
Instead of taking a traditional birth control pill every day, a
woman could take an RU 486 pill for only three days of her
cycle. 99 A woman taking RU 486 would be less likely to forget
to take the pills and would suffer fewer side effects than a
woman taking daily birth control pills.'00 RU 486 also may
allow more women to use monthly contraceptives because a
woman who cannot tolerate estrogen or progestogen may be
able to tolerate RU 486.'01
Many questions remain unanswered. For example, an
RU 486 birth control pill may lead to lower estrogen levels in
95. See id. at 1041, 1043-44.
96. See id. at 1044. Forty-two percent of the women in the RU 486 group had
delays in the onset of the next menstrual period, compared to thirteen percent in the
alternative group. See id. at 1044.
97. See Jeremy Cherfas & Joseph Palca, Hormone Antagonist with Broad Poten-
tial, 245 SCIENCE 1322 (1989). Lynette Nieman of the National Institute of Health
found that administration of RU 486 to women in the first part of their cycles
delayed ovulation, while administration to women in the later part of their cycles
induced menstruation. See David Hamilton, RU 486: More than an Abortion Pill,
TECH. REV., May-June 1990, at 18. Even under the abortion opponents' definition,
RU 486 acts as a contraceptive rather than an abortifacient when it delays ovulation.
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
98. See Cherfas & Palca, supra note 97, at 1332; see also Hamilton, supra note
97, at 18.
99. See Tony Kaye, Are You for RU 486? A New Pill and the Abortion Debate,
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1986, at 13, 14 (explaining that RU 486 would either
prevent the ovum from implanting if fertilization had taken place, or merely induce
menstruation if it had not).
100. See Joannie M. Schrof, Reproduction Showdown: Advocates Predict the
Abortion Pill Will Revolutionize Women's Health, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22,
1993, at 32, 34; see also Sandy Rovner, The Pill: Three Decades Later, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 1990, (Health) at 17 (explaining that many women experience side effects
from taking daily birth control pills and that a "stumbling block" to their effective-
ness is forgetfulness).
101. See Hamilton, supra note 97, at 18 ("[Women may eventually take RU 486
as an estrogen-free contraceptive. That would provide an alternative for women over
35, for whom the current hormone-based contraceptives increase the risk of cancer.").
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women, which may put them at greater risk of osteoporosis.10
2
RU 486 administered in the latter part of a woman's cycle
may lead to shorter menstrual cycles, the consequences of
which are unknown. °3 Scientists also do not yet know the full
health impact of repeated RU 486 treatments over an extend-
ed period of time.
1 4
C. As a Medicine'
0 5
RU 486 may have medical applications extending beyond
reproductive control.'0° As a progesterone antagonist, RU 486
stimulates lactation. 0 7 By softening and dilating the cervix,
RU 486 also may induce labor, reducing the need for caesare-
an sections in difficult live births, or facilitating the expulsion




105. The medical applications of RU 486 have broadened the support for the drug
in the United States. Cf Diane M. Gianelli, Wyden: Pressure Groups Blocking
RU 486 Testing; FDA Denies Charges, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 7, 1990, at 3 (describing
testimony at a congressional hearing in support of research on other medical uses of
RU 486). Those opposed to RU 486's contragestive use also oppose bringing RU 486
into the United States under a therapeutic-use umbrella. See id.; cf H.R. 798, 102d
Cong. § 2 (1991) (introduced by former Representative Robert Dornan (R-CA), an
abortion rights opponent) (prohibiting providing any "form of Federal financial
assistance" for research on RU 486 in order "to obtain its approval under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act"); H.R. 619, 101st Cong. (1989) (prohibiting federal
funding for RU 486 research).
106. See Etienne-Emile Baulieu, Contragestion and Other Clinical Applications
of RU 486, an Antiprogesterone at the Receptor, 245 SCIENCE 1351, 1355-56 (1989)
("RU 486 has also been used to treat PR-containing meningiomas and breast cancer
that has become resistant to tamoxifen."); see also The Product Liability Fairness Act
of 1995: Hearings on S. 565 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Affairs & Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 104th
Cong. 212 (1995) (statement of Phyllis Greenberger, Executive Dir., Society for the
Advancement of Women's Health Research) (listing other possible medical uses for
RU 486); Ulmann, supra note 60, at 48 (discussing possible applications of RU 486);
Marsha F. Goldsmith, As Data on Antiprogesterone Compounds Grow, Societal and
Scientific Aspects Are Scrutinized, 265 JAMA 1628, 1629 (1991) (discussing the
potential use of RU 486 in treating breast cancer).
107. See Ulmann, supra note 60, at 48 (stating that RU 486 triggers lactation in
monkeys).
108. See id.; see also Goldsmith, supra note 106, at 1628 ("[Tlhe results of the
clinical trials of RU 486 for ... ripening of the cervix at term and expulsion of the
fetus after spontaneous intrauterine death during the second and third trimester...
are so encouraging that its approval for these purposes appears to be 'imminent.' ").
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used as a progesterone antagonist, RU 486 may treat tumors,
such as breast cancer and meningioma. Breast cancer
sometimes spreads with the assistance of estrogen and
progesterone; by blocking the progesterone receptors, RU 486
seems to stop the growth of the tumors. 109 In some patients
studied, RU 486 shrank tumors "to less than half their former
size.""' In addition, RU 486 does not appear to lose
effectiveness over time as do other repeated hormonal cancer
therapies, although it does cause side effects for some patients
(such as nausea, hot flashes and dizziness)."1 RU 486 also
may treat meningioma, a type of tumor in the brain or spinal
cord, which, although generally benign, can become so large
as to cause neurological disorders.112 Meningioma tumor cells
contain progesterone receptors and grow in reaction to pro-
gesterone;113 by blocking progesterone activity in the tumor,
RU 486 may stop the tumor's growth. Studies of progesterone-
antagonist applications of RU 486 are ongoing.
114
Additionally, studies indicate that RU 486 may prove
therapeutic as a treatment for skin wounds and Cushing's
Syndrome." 5 RU 486 may facilitate healing of skin wounds,
such as burns and abrasions, by blocking the activity of
corticosteroids which delay healing."' RU 486 may also
counter the excess production of cortisone that causes Cush-
ing's Syndrome, and either treat the disease or maintain a
patient's health long enough for surgery to be effective in
removing the tumor.1 7 Studies of RU 486 as an antiglu-
cocorticoid are ongoing.11
109. See Hamilton, supra note 97, at 19.
110. Id. Scientists studied the effects of RU 486 on breast cancers in Montpellier,
France and at the Lombardi Center of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
See Cherfas & Palca, supra note 97, at 1322.
111. See Hamilton, supra note 97, at 19.
112. See Cherfas & Palca, supra note 97, at 1322 (noting that studies have been
conducted in Holland, France and the U.S., but "no clear-cut results are in yet");
Herman, supra note 60, at 14 (noting that preliminary findings at the University of
Southern California showed some success in treating these tumors with RU 486).
113. See Herman, supra note 60, at 14.
114. See Cherfas & Palca, supra note 97, at 1322.
115. See id. at 1322 ("Cushing's syndrome ... can be caused by a tumor in the
adrenal cortex that can't be detected when it first arises. RU 486 can be used to keep
patients alive until the tumor becomes large enough to be isolated and surgically
removed.").
116. See Cherfas & Palca, supra note 97, at 1322.
117. See id. Dr. George Chrousos of the National Institutes of Health, is studying
this application of RU 486. Between 1983 and 1990, he treated eight Cushing's
patients, among whom five "showed complete regression of the disease." Gianelli,
supra note 105, at 24.
118. See Cherfas & Palca, supra note 97, at 1322.
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III. THE LEGAL IMPACT OF RU 486 ON ABORTION 119
Physiologically, the RU 486 technology "blurs the distinction
between contraception and abortion" 2 ° because it operates
before fertilization, in the "grey" period between fertilization
and implantation, and after implantation.'12 RU 486's range of
effectiveness suggests that there is not a bright-line distinc-
tion between preventing pregnancy and terminating it in its
early stages. The two practices overlap.
22
In the past, the distinction between contraception and
abortion was clear because contraception operated before
fertilization (undeniably before the beginning of a pregnancy),
while abortion operated after six weeks of fertilization (unde-
niably after the beginning of a pregnancy). RU 486 acts at
119. This Article does not focus on the political impact of RU 486, but rather on
the legal implications of the drug's existence. The political implications of RU 486
have been discussed widely, especially with regard to the drug's potential to make
abortion a private procedure. See LAWRENCE LADER, A PRIVATE MATTER 10, 18, 213
(1995); see also David M. Smolin, Cultural and Technological Obstacles to the
Mainstreaming of Abortion, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 261, 264 (1993) ("Many
within the abortion rights movement hope that RU-486 ... will make abortion truly
private, truly an act both chosen and controlled by the individual women. Such
technologies arguably could eliminate the public vulnerability of abortion, because
separate abortion facilities would no longer exist as sites of protest .... The
prescribing and dispensing of abortifacients, and the care of aborting women, would
perhaps be tasks integrated into the larger medical establishment. Thus, technology
would ultimately make real the promises of pro-choice rhetoric.") (footnotes omitted);
Ernest Van den Haag, Is There a Middle Ground?, NAT'L REV., Dec. 22, 1989, at 29,
31 (stating that "technological changes [like RU 486] may make much of the legal-
abortion debate academic").
120. David Savage & Karen Tumulty, Behind-the Scenes Battle Rages Over "Abor-
tion Pill," L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1989, at 1 (statement of Sharon Camp, Vice President
of the Population Crisis Council).
121. See Porter, supra note 66, at 209. To some extent, the line was blurred by
earlier technologies, such as the low-dose birth control pill and the IUD, that operate
both before and after fertilization. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Under
the abortion opponents' definition, such technologies are both contraceptives and
abortifacients. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. RU 486 is the first to
operate before and after fertilization, as well as after implantation. RU 486 is, thus,
the first contragestive technology to be both a contraceptive and an abortifacient
under the medical definition of pregnancy. See Elizabeth A. Silverberg, Looking
Beyond Judicial Deference to Agency Discretion: A Fundamental Right of Access to
RU 486?, BROOK. L. REV. 1551, 1608 (1994); see also supra notes 10-13 and accompa-
nying text. To use standard definitions, RU 486 can function as a contraceptive, a
postcoital contraceptive or an abortifacient, depending on the time of its use during
the procreative process. See supra Parts II.A-II.B.
122. See Oral Argument of Frank Susman on Behalf of the Appellees at 27,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
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different times, including the period after fertilization but
before the sixth week of pregnancy that was ignored by past
practice. Depending on the time of its use, RU 486 may pre-
vent ovulation, implantation, or retention of the fertilized egg
by the uterus after implantation. It is difficult to determine
which uses of RU 486 are contraceptive and which are abor-
tive.
It is no longer clear that the abortion decision is "different
in kind from the decision not to conceive in the first place." 23
While abstinence seems clearly different from an abortion, the
use of a contraceptive IUD, which could potentially terminate
procreative development one to three days after intercourse, 24
is not clearly different from the use of an abortifacient several
days later. Is the use of RU 486 one day after intercourse so
clearly different from its use three, five or ten days later?
Physiologically, it would seem that "contraception and abor-
tion are.., points on a continuum, " "' different in degree but
not in kind.
The blurred physiological line between contraception and
abortion causes more than semantic difficulties. RU 486 does
not neatly fit into the analytic framework developed by the
courts. A woman who takes RU 486 monthly as a birth control
pill may be protected by Griswold and its progeny, free to act
without state interference. 26 A woman who takes RU 486
within seventy-two hours of unprotected intercourse, as a
postcoital contraceptive, also may be protected by the
Griswold line, free to act without state interference.' 27 A
woman who takes RU 486 in her eighth week of pregnancy,
practicing the equivalent of a surgical abortion, may be sub-
ject to Casey and will not be free to act without interference
from burdensome state regulations. What about the woman
who takes RU 486 two, four, five, ten, twenty, or thirty days
after unprotected intercourse? Is she protected by Griswold, or
is she subject to state regulation under Casey? Courts have
123. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 US.
747, 792 n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
124. See Hatcher, supra note 16, at 355 (stating that the IUD could prevent
fertilization and/or impair, prevent or inhibit implantation).
125. Brief of Amici Curiae 274 Organizations, supra note 23, at 8.
126. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 52. The issue ofpostcoital contraceptives has not been litigat-
ed because no state has attempted to impose burdensome regulations on its use.
Therefore, the Court's comments are merely indicative of its leanings.
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not had the occasion to characterize the termination of the
procreative process occurring after fertilization but before the
sixth week of pregnancy.
To preserve its current framework and maintain a clear
distinction between contraception and abortion, the Court
needs to categorize the period between fertilization and the
sixth week of pregnancy, the period thus far ignored by law. 128
The Court will have to recognize the existence of this "grey"
period between fertilization and implantation and to define its
constitutional significance.
The Court could adopt the abortion opponents' definition of
pregnancy and draw a bright line declaring that any method
used prior to fertilization is contraception and any method
used afterward is abortion. 129 With such a line, only barrier
method contraceptives-condoms and diaphragms-would be
contraception because other traditional "contraception" meth-
ods-IUDs and low-dose birth control pills-have the potential
to act after fertilization. A bright line drawn at fertilization
would run counter to the Court's assertion that low-dose birth
control pills, IUD's and postcoital contraceptives are methods
of contraception protected by Griswold.130 A bright line drawn
at fertilization could also run counter to common understand-
ings of contraception. Although the Court is not bound by
public sentiment, it is sensitive to public opinions and is eager
to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the people.' 3 '
Alternatively, the Court could adopt the medical definition
of pregnancy and maintain the bright line distinction between
contraception and abortion by drawing a line at implanta-
tion.' 32  Such a line, however, would be difficult to
128. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
131. In Casey, the Court stated that:
The Court's power lies.., in its legitimacy, a product of substance and percep-
tion that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to
determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands....
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them .... Thus, the Court's
legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances
in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the
Nation.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992).
132. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
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administer.133 While the Court could conceivably judge a
method according to the fertilization line by determining
whether the method allows the egg and the sperm to come in
contact, 134 the Court cannot draw a bright line at implantation
with any accuracy. Scientists estimate that implantation
begins five to six days after fertilization, and is completed six
to seven days later. This time period leaves room for much
uncertainty and error.'35 To make any determination regarding
implantation, the Court would need to know the date of
intercourse and the details of a woman's menstrual cycle. In
order to enforce such a prohibition, a State would be forced to
"allow the police to search the sacred precincts of ... bed-
rooms for telltale signs."' This is not acceptable; because "the
very idea is repulsive to ... notions of privacy."'37
The Court has stated that "[clonsistent with other consti-
tutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear
arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But
courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw." 3 ' A bright
line between contraception and abortion is not justifiable.
RU 486 blurs the physiological line between abortion and
contraception. "In the absence of a bright physiological line,
there can be no bright constitutional line drawn between the
moments before and after conception."
139
In Casey, abortion was said to be unique because it was
"fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who
must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons
who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse,
family, and society which must confront the knowledge that
these procedures exist."4 ° Are the consequences of ingesting
the RU 486 pill different depending on whether the woman
133. Cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (stating that the Court should consider whether
Roe has become "unworkable" as part of its stare decisis analysis).
134. If contact occurs, there will be fertilization and the method is abortive. If
there is no opportunity for contact, there can be no fertilization, and the method used
to prohibit contact between the egg and the sperm is contraceptive.
135. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
136. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
137. Id.
138. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
139. Brief ofAmici Curiae 274 Organizations, supra note 23, at 9; see also Annette
Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 307-08
(1993) ("The more difficult it is to draw fine physiologic lines between contraceptives
and abortifacients, the more difficult it is to treat them as morally distinguishable.").
140. Casey, 505 US. at 852.
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swallows it on day zero, one, five or ten? Why is the state
interest in potential life not important enough preceding or
immediately following intercourse to allow for any but the
most "compelling" and narrow regulation, but so important
days later to allow for all but the most "unduly burdensome"
regulation?
The Constitution, the Supreme Court and societal notions of
equity mandate that the law be fair and treat similarly situat-
ed people similarly. Would it not violate such a mandate to
grant one woman total freedom to act while severely curtailing
the freedom of another woman taking the same action mo-
ments later? Can the law restrict one woman's right simply
because of a suspicion that her fertilized egg may have com-
pleted its implantation? If it has not, then the woman has
been treated differently from another woman whose egg was
also not implanted but who was allowed to use postcoital
contraceptives.
The Court should not impose distinct categories of "con-
traception" and "abortion" when the categories overlap and are
not clearly distinguishable. "It is difficult to attach very much
significance to any one point in time in a developmental
continuum. All attempts to do so are vulnerable to the ques-
tion of why this moment is ethically distinct from one hour
earlier or one hour later in the [pregnancy] .
In setting standards, the Court must use "reasoned judg-
ment."14 2 The Court can establish a sounder, more workable
and more reasoned "procreative right" standard by ridding
itself of the artificial bright line between contraception and
abortion and adopting a "continuum" approach, a series of
blurred lines paralleling the physiological developmental
continuum of pregnancy. 43 With a continuum approach, the
Court need no longer search for physiological reference points
141. Alan Brownstein & Paul Dau, The Constitutional Morality of Abortion, 33
B.C. L. REV. 689, 748 (1992).
142. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
143. See Brownstein & Dau, supra note 141, at 698-700 (discussing the concept
of a developmental continuum analysis). Frank Susman, representing Reproductive
Health Services in Webster, used the term "procreative right" in oral arguments. "The
bright-line, if there ever was one, has now been extinguished. That's why I suggest
to this court that we need to deal with one right, the right to procreate. We are no
longer talking about two rights." Susman, supra note 122, at 28. Susman was
referring to contragestive methods which operate before and after fertilization (but
not after implantation). See id. at 27-28.
RU 486 Examined
to act as demarcation lines, and it need no longer overhaul its
standards every time science and medicine find new reference
points and new technologies to blur the line between existing
reference points.
Critics of the continuum approach may be concerned about
a slippery slope, fearing that the blurring of contraception and
abortion would extend to such an extreme that a court could
no longer distinguish between barrier method contraceptions
and partial-birth abortions. The Court, however, has respond-
ed to similar fears by noting that interests are not static.
144
Even if there were no legal bright lines separating contracep-
tion from abortion, the legal treatment of pre-fertilization
contragestion would differ from that of a third trimester
abortion because the interests at stake are different.
The Court can use a sliding scale or balancing test to define
the procreative standard, to evaluate the various contragestive
methods and to weigh the different interests that exist along
the continuum. The Court can find that a state's interests in
potential life, maternal health and the general preference for
childbirth increase as the procreative process progresses. 45
Under the continuum approach, the Court can also find that
a woman's right to have an abortion decreases as the pregnan-
cy progresses. Commentators argue that a woman's interest in
having an abortion shifts just as a state's interests do.146 They
posit that a woman needs "sufficient time to make a deliber-
ate, informed and reflective choice as to whether or not she
wants to carry her pregnancy to term,"' 47 but that her inter-
ests in, and rights to, sexual autonomy, bodily integrity and
psychological integrity weaken as the pregnancy progresses.
48
Finally, they claim that "if the woman's interest in terminat-
ing her pregnancy declines to a sufficient extent, the balancing
necessary to justify abortion restrictions may be accomplished
without determining exactly when the conceptus experiences
a life worth living." 49
144. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (stating that the state's
interests in the protection of potential life and maternal health grow "in substanti-
ality as the woman approaches term").
145. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
146. See Brownstein & Dau, supra note 141, at 749-59.
147. Id. at 753-54.
148. See id. at 754-59.
149. Id. at 749.
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This procreative continuum approach does not dictate a
specific outcome. With the adoption of this approach the Court
can balance the same factors identified in past opinions and
create a procreative standard under which the interests of the
state and the woman intersect along the continuum early in
the pregnancy. Under this procreative standard, states could
restrict most abortions and could regulate traditional contra-
ception. The Court could create a standard under which the
state's interests do not outweigh the woman's until very late
in the pregnancy, protecting contraception and most abor-
tions150 from state interference. The Court could also create a
standard where early contragestion, whether contraceptive or
abortive, receives some protection while later contragestion
receives less. Despite these differing potential outcomes, the
proposed continuum approach toward contragestive technolo-
gies is a unified approach. The variation in protection will
occur gradually rather than suddenly,15 1 more accurately
reflecting the gradual shifts in the identified interests and
rights.
The continuum approach to the procreative right is consis-
tent with the majority of Americans' views on the subject, and
is thus more legitimate than the bright line labels and distinct
legal standards used today.'52 The continuum approach, how-
ever, may not be welcomed by abortion activists on either side
of the debate who derive their power by "castling] the [abor-
tion] issue in black and white."153 This continuum standard
creates varying shades of grey that are more difficult to use in
soundbites, rallying cries or mobilizing speeches.
The shades of grey and blurred lines created by RU 486 will
not end the abortion controversy. The existence of RU 486,
however, may broaden and deepen the abortion debate,
150. See Abortion Surveillance: Preliminary Analysis-United States, 1986 and
1987, 262 JAMA 2076, 2076 (1989) (stating that in 1987 approximately fifty percent
of all abortions were performed before the ninth week of pregnancy, and about eighty-
eight percent were performed during the first trimester).
151. See supra Part I.B.
152. See Wilcox, supra note 3, at 67. Social scientists label a narrow majority of
Americans "situationalists" because their views on abortion depend on the circum-
stances of the pregnancy. See id.; see also ELIZABETH ADELL COOK ET AL., BETWEEN
Two ABSOLUTES: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 191-196 (1992)
(summarizing the ways that most Americans think about the abortion issue).
Americans support abortion most strongly in the early weeks of pregnancy, and in
situations of "danger to the mother's health, a strong chance of serious defects in the
baby, and pregnancy that results from rape." Robert Blendon et al., The Public and
the Controversy over Abortion, 270 JAMA 2871, 2872 (1993).
153. Kaye, supra note 99, at 15.
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perhaps merging it with a larger societal debate of reproduc-
tive control, family planning, sexual morality, sexual conduct,
sexual education and the role of women in the family and
society.154 Carol Maxwell wrote that:
Abortion has become the issue; I believe it is a red herring,
distracting people from the more profound issues of human
suffering and limited life-possibilities. By focusing on the
legal status of abortion, we deal with the effect of diverse
social problems rather than addressing the problems
themselves.1
5
If that is our predicament, then RU 486 may help to end the
distraction and allow us to focus on the profound issues and
problems in our society.
It is unlikely that a nation so bitterly divided over abortion
will come to unanimous agreement on the broader issues of
sexual morality, reproductive control and gender roles. There
will be opposing sides for these issues, just as there are today
for abortion, and as there have been in the past for virtually
every social, political or economic matter.156 For example, if
the abortion debate becomes part of a larger debate about
reproductive control, there will be those who favor
contragestive technologies, stating:
Women's capacity to control reproduction is central to their
lives. The ability to plan whether to have children, how
many, and when, is critical to equality in the workplace,
educational plans, political participation-indeed, to con-
trol over the way in which our lives are spent in general.5 7
154. Cf COOK ET AL., supra note 152, at 4 ("[T]he abortion issue involves, at least
in part, a debate about 'proper' sexual behavior."); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 193 (1984) ("[Tlhis round of the abortion debate is so pas-
sionate and hard-fought because it is a referendum on the place and meaning of
motherhood."); Amy Fried, Abortion Politics as Symbolic Politics: An Investigation
into Belief Systems, 69 Soc. ScI. Q. 137, 137-54 (1988) (analyzing survey results
about the symbolism of abortion politics); Law, supra note 37, at 935 ('[Tihe abortion
dispute ... poses a conflict between competing visions of the role of gender, sexuality,
and family in a good life and good society.").
155. Carol J.C. Maxwell, Introduction: Beyond Polemics and Toward Healing, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF ABORTION, supra note 3, at 16.
156. See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG & DAVID M. O' BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 148 (1993) (discussing the effect of the abortion controversy on the political
debates over other important social issues).
157. MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY,
CASES AND MATERIALS 353 (1994).
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And there will be those who oppose contragestive technologies:
[There] are ... serious medical and social problems that
have flourished as a by-product of [living in a] contracep-
tive culture[.] The first is the teenage pregnancy epidemic
.... Data indicated that for every million dollars added to
the budget for contraceptive research, education, and
supply, another 200 teenage pregnancies occurred....
Another medical problem more easily related to the
advance in contraceptive technology is the epidemic of
STDs....
The social problems clearly related to the technological
advances in contraception ... are divorce and the single-
parent family and its effects on the children involved....
... In my judgment the only answer is a return to teach-
ing chastity in our homes, schools, and churches. 5 '
Those in opposition may claim that this technology (like
abortion), "by giving women control over their fertility, . . .
breaks up an intricate set of social relationships between men
and women. .. and supports a world view that deemphasizes
(and therefore downgrades) the traditional roles of men and
women."
159
Those opposing and supporting contragestive technology and
abortion have "dramatically different world views " "O not easily
reconciled. Nevertheless, disagreement is different from the
"culture war" 6' that has existed to date.'62 Educated and ratio-
nal debate is a healthy and integral part of our democracy. In
contrast the shouting and shooting of the abortion controversy
has the potential to undermine our democracy. RU 486 may
make a significant contribution by altering the terms of the
debate, even if it cannot end the debate.
158. William F. Colliton, Jr., Contraception and Abortion: Is There a Connection?,
13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 315, 323-26 (1993).
159. LUKER, supra note 154, at 162.
160. Law, supra note 37, at 936.
161. See Hunter, supra note 2, at C2.
162. See supra notes 2-3, 5 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
RU 486 offers women an alternative to traditional methods
of contragestion, and offers men and women an alternative to
traditional treatments for serious diseases.'63 Legally, RU 486
blurs the line between contraception and early abortion. This
blurring should promote the adoption of a unified continuum
approach to reproductive control." However, RU 486 is neither
a panacea nor the ultimate answer to the abortion controversy.
It cannot bring an end to the abortion controversy or offer us
resolution in a neat, painless pill. 6 ' Like all technologies, and
like the law, RU 486 is merely a tool for society to use in its
struggles. As an instrument of change, RU 486 has the poten-
tial to affect our lives in significant positive and negative ways.
Society, however, must define its culture and norms for itself.
If there is a resolution to the abortion controversy, it will be
found through social discourse, and not through a pill. "The
understanding of abortion as an actual practice in real
lives-the social norms about abortion-[should] be negotiated
in the more fluid and multiplicitous realm of culture."'66
163. See supra Part II.C.
164. See supra Part III.
165. See Hunter, supra note 2, at C2.
166. CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING
SOCIAL CHANGE 123 (1990).
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